On August 21, a Kansas federal judge dismissed charges against a defendant for violating the machine gun ban, saying that “the government has not met its burden under Bruen and Rahimi to demonstrate through historical analogs that regulation of the weapons at issue in this case are consistent with the nation’s history of firearms regulation.”
From the decision by United States District Judge John W. Broomes in Wichita, Kansas: “Defendant Tamori Morgan is charged with two counts of possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). (Doc. 1.) Specifically, Defendant is charged with possessing an Anderson Manufacturing, model AM-15 .300 caliber machinegun and a machinegun conversion device. It was established at the hearing that the conversion device is a so-called ‘Glock switch’ which allows a Glock, model 33, .357 SIG caliber firearm to fire as an automatic weapon.”
In a decision that will likely be appealed, but which reads clearly and succinctly on point, Judge Broomes writes (citations omitted): “Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him. Defendant first argues that, under the first step of Bruen, the plain text of the Second Amendment applies to his conduct of possessing machineguns. The government argues to the contrary, pointing to language in Heller that suggests the unconstitutionality of machinegun regulation would be ‘startling,’ and that the Second Amendment only applies to weapons that were commonly used by law-abiding citizens at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment….”
Further: “Here, Plaintiff is charged with two counts of machinegun possession, and both counts apply to arms that can be carried in the hand. Thus, by definition, the machinegun and Glock switch are bearable arms within the plain text of the Second Amendment. The government relies on Heller to argue that machineguns are not covered by the plain text of that amendment. The Heller language cited by the government is unavailing….
“Moreover, it bears noting that, unlike § 922(o), the National Firearms Act does not categorically prohibit the possession of the sawed-off shotgun at issue in Miller or the firearms at issue in this case; rather, that act regulates possession of such weapons by restricting possession to those who comply with the registration and taxation requirements imposed under the act….
“To summarize, in this case, the government has not met its burden under Bruen and Rahimi to demonstrate through historical analogs that regulation of the weapons at issue in this case are consistent with the nation’s history of firearms regulation. Indeed, the government has barely tried to meet that burden….
“Rather, under Bruen’s framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges, it is the government’s burden to identify a historical analog to the restrictions challenged in this case. This the government has failed to do.”
Please read the full decision at the link below. It is spectacular.
